Sahara: despite Algiers’ efforts, Washington’s position remains unchanged

Algeria is trying to make the best of a difficult situation — but with little success.

Few are likely to be convinced by the statement issued on Friday, April 17, 2026, by Algeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following talks in Antalya (Turkey) between Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf and Massad Boulos, senior advisor to the U.S. president for Arab and African affairs. The two officials were in the Turkish coastal city to attend the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, a gathering often described as a “mini Davos” of global diplomacy launched by Ankara in 2021.

The Algerian statement highlighted what it described as the “positive momentum” in bilateral relations, citing the high level of strategic dialogue and the promising prospects for economic cooperation. Only later did it turn to the substance of the discussions, referring to developments in Libya and Sudan, as well as the latest developments in the Sahara issue.

Notably, the Sahara appeared only at the very end of the statement, almost as an afterthought, despite being widely regarded in Algiers as a core and non-negotiable matter — described as “dogmatic” by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune himself in an interview with the French daily L’Opinion in July 2020.

An unchanged U.S. stance

Beyond this sequencing, however, what the statement leaves unsaid is perhaps more telling. At no point does it suggest that Washington has altered — even marginally — its position on the Sahara, regardless of the touted improvement in bilateral ties. In a separate post published on Saturday, April 18, Boulos referred broadly to “regional issues of mutual interest, particularly various conflicts and humanitarian crises,” without any specific mention of the Saharan provinces.

I had a productive meeting with Algerian Foreign Minister Attaf to deepen our commercial and security partnership. We welcomed progress in discussions on Algeria’s unconventional gas resources and explored opportunities for U.S. companies to support the country’s critical… pic.twitter.com/zM2WXh0O5c

— U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs (@US_SrAdvisorAF) April 18, 2026

Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, Algiers has sought to project a renewed partnership with Washington, particularly in security and economic fields — with its ambassador in Washington, Sabri Boukadoum, even declaring in March 2025 that “sky is the limit” for bilateral cooperation. Yet this diplomatic push has done little to shift the U.S. position. The recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara in December 2020 has since become an established pillar of U.S. policy, one that even the Biden administration (2021–2025) chose not to revisit, despite internal sensitivities more receptive to Algeria’s stance.

That position was further consolidated under the Trump administration’s second term, notably with the adoption at the UN Security Council of Resolution 2797 on the Sahara, the first to formally endorse the Moroccan autonomy plan as the basis for negotiations — explicitly identifying Algeria among the parties concerned. This came despite sustained Algerian lobbying efforts in the final hours before the vote, leveraging its status at the time as a non-permanent member of the Council.

Officially, Washington continues to strike a careful balance, maintaining a measured tone toward Algiers and signaling openness through deliberately calibrated messaging. This restraint appears to reflect a broader strategic calculation: a prolonged deterioration in Moroccan-Algerian relations would weaken the Maghreb and create greater room for Chinese and Russian influence.

Morocco as a pillar of stability

Around the same time as the Attaf-Boulos meeting, Lieutenant General James Adams, director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, told a House subcommittee on April 16 that the growing influence of China and Russia in Africa is a major concern for U.S. security officials. This trend is particularly visible in the Sahel — the Maghreb’s strategic hinterland — where Beijing and Moscow are capitalizing on local political and security vulnerabilities.

By contrast, Morocco was presented as an increasingly central pillar of stability in North Africa, reinforced by broad international backing for its autonomy initiative. From Washington’s perspective, the expectation appears to be that Algeria, too, will gradually align with a more stable and coherent regional order.

This also explains the apparent willingness to involve Algiers in ongoing discussions on the Sahara since early 2026. While Algeria has long played a key role in sustaining the dispute, a more stable and strategically coherent Maghreb will ultimately require a repositioning of Algiers. Whether Algerian decision-makers are prepared to recognize this shift — and avoid condemning the region to further decades of sterile confrontation — remains an open question.